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DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT AND OTHER

TECHNIQUES TO PRESERVE
MISSOURI'S FARMLANDS
MARK B. LAPPING,* ROBERT J. BEVINS,**
& PAUL V. HERBERS***
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has become readily apparent that a growing number of Americans
prefer to live near-but not in-relatively large cities.' This is reflected by a
large and growing demand for rural land. Increases in the market value of
farmland have been dramatic in recent years. From 1970 to 1974 the
increase was almost 13 percent per year.2 Increases in income from farmland, however, have not kept pace with these increases in market value. In
3
fact, in many instances farmland income has declined.
When a significant amount of land in a predominantly farming area is
devoted to residential or industrial uses, the market value of the remaining
farmland tends to rise. 4 Therefore, assessments based on market value will
increase. This occurs despite zoning regulation to the contrary because the
assessor, acting on the assumption that increased developmental pressures
will force zoning variances to be granted, raises his assessment to reflect
expected developmental value. 5 A higher assessment results in a higher
property tax, and the increased taxes are so burdensome that farmers are
often forced to sell the land or convert it to nonagricultural uses. 6 This loss
of prime agricultural land reduces the potential for food production,
pushes aesthetic benefits associated with open spaces farther away from the
* Associate Director, Environmental Program, Associate Professor Environmental Studies and Natural Resources, University of Vermont; B.S. 1967 State
University of New York; Ph.D. 1972 Emory University.
** Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri Columbia; B.S. 1949 University of Tennessee; M.S. 1955 University of Tennessee;
Ph.D. 1960 Michigan State University.
*** Member of the class of 1977, University of Missouri School of Law.
I. R. GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENTS: THEORY, PRACTICE AND IMPACT 4 (1974).
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
See Elias and Gillies, Some Observationson the Role of Speculators and Speculation in Land Development, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 789 (1965); Freilich & Ragsdale,

Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning:
An Analysis of the New Directionsfor Land Use Control in the Minneapolis - St. Paul
Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1075 (1974).
6. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 1.
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city core, and destroys economies inherent in large-scale farming
7
operations.
The problems of urban sprawl and improper regional growth have
received wide national attention in the past fifteen years. 8 Concern has
been expressed not only for preservation of agricultural lands, but also for
preservation of other types of open space. There is interest that swamp
lands not be drained, that forest lands be maintained intact, and that land
along wild rivers and other waters not be developed. In order to preserve
land in a natural or open state to satisfy the agricultural, recreational, and
aesthetic requirements of both rural and urban populations, a policy of
carefully planned development must replace that of wasteful unplanned
growth. 9 A number of methods have been proposed to implement such a
policy. Several of these methods and the consequences of their adoption
will be discussed.

II.

DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT

Differential assessment is one technique which has been advanced to
alleviate the effects of increased property tax burdens on farmland. The
technique involves assessing the land at its value as a farm in use instead of
assessing the land at its fair market value. Assuming that the use-value is
less than the fair market value of farmland in developing areas, land
assessments and therefore property taxes should be reduced for farmland
owners. The expectation is that lower property taxes will encourage farmers to maintain the land in agricultural use in the presence of nearby
development. In addition, the percentage of personal income which the
farmer must apply to the payment of real estate taxes should decrease,
approaching the percentages incurred by non-farm landowners.
A.

Description

1. Common Approaches to Differential Assessment
The use of taxation schemes to implement open land policies has a
relatively recent history. 10 Early suggestions, beginning in the 1920's,
11
focused on reduced taxation for golf courses and recreational areas.
Legislative action began in the 1950's. Minnesota enacted a statute providing tax relief to landowners in exchange for use of the property for
hunting or fishing. 12 In 1956, Maryland became the first state to enact a
7. See Henke, PreferentialProperty Tax Treatment for Farmland, 53 ORE. L.
REV. 117 (1974).
8. Lewis, Waking Up, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1974, at 35, col. 1.
9. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., Governmental Structure Organizationand Planningin Metropolitan Areas, 40, (Comm. Print 1961).
10. See Hagman, Open Space Planningand PropertyTaxation-Some Suggestions,
1964 WIs. L. REV. 628, 634.
11. Id.
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.59 (West Supp. 1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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comprehensive taxation
scheme for agricultural lands with some land use
13
planning motives.
Differential assessment for farmland and open space can be adopted
in any of several basic forms. The first general approach is preferential
assessment, whereby land devoted to agricultural use is assessed on the
basis of its value in that use. Under a preferential assessment program, no
penalty is imposed if the owner decides to put his property into non-farm
uses. 4 This is the approach Missouri has adopted. A second technique is
deferred taxation. Under this approach land is assessed according to its
value in its current use. If the owner changes the use of the land to some
use not qualifying under the law, a deferred tax (frequently called a
rollback tax) is levied. The amount of the tax is equal to the tax savings
received by the owner for a designated number of years preceding the
change in use. 15 A third method is the use of restrictive agreements. Under
this method the state or local government may make agreements with
landowners by which the landowners agree to restrict the use of their land
for a specified period of years in return for tax concessions. If the landowner changes the use of the land, charges or penalties may be imposed.
There are two significant differences among these approaches to differential assessment. First, those taxes which the landowner saves under a
tax deferral scheme, or some portion of them, are recovered by the state or
local government when the land is converted to a non-qualifying use. This
recovery of lost taxes is not available in preferential assessment programs.
Second, restrictive agreements are granted as a matter of governmental
discretion, and thus the state or local government will generally enter into a
restrictive agreement with a landowner only after a determination that
such an agreement serves the public purpose. In deferred taxation or
preferential assessment programs a landowner is entitled to the benefits of
these programs as a matter of right if his land meets the eligibility requirements.
In addition to these approaches, several other methods are available to
provide farmlands with the advantages of assessment at less than fair
market value. One method is a classified property tax system in which
6
different assessment ratios are applied to different types of properties.'
The assessment ratio for each type of property is fixed. Thus any increase
in market value results in an equal percentage increase in the assessed
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (Supp. 1976). Note that Ontario had a
differential assessment plan the year before. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 27 (1970).
14. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, STATE PROGRAMS FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL
ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND 2 (U.S. Econ. Research Serv. Ag.

Econ. Rept. no. 256, April 1974)
15. Id.
16. For a more complete discussion see International Association of Assessing
Officials, Research and Technical Services Dept., "Classified Property Tax System,"
mimeographed (Chicago: IAAO, Research and Technical Services Dept., April
1974), as cited in R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 1, at 23.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

value. In the use-value assessment systems previously discussed, market
value fluctuations do not necessarily affect the assessed value because there
is no predetermined assessment ratio.
Another method is the general directive. Under this approach the
assessor is directed to consider all current land use controls to be permanent. Any potential for development in excess of that permitted by the
17
zoning ordinance or other restriction currently in force is to be ignored.
Tax relief can also be provided in the form of exemptions from or
limitations to the applicable tax rates. Current statutes which exempt farm
structures and improvements from the property tax can be broadened to
include farmland. Alternatively, the property tax can be applied in a
limited fashion, setting the tax rate on farmland lower than the rate
8
applied to other types of real estate.'
Finally, there is a newly proposed alternative to differential assessment, the so-called "circuit-breaker." 19 Under a circuit-breaker system,
property tax payments which exceed certain percentages of income would
either be deducted from state income taxes or directly rebated to the
taxpayer.2" A serious problem with circuit-breakers based on farm income
is that rebates to speculators will probably be much greater than those to
farmers. This problem is being met in Michigan by a requirement that the
landowner forfeit his rights to develop the land in exchange for circuit2
breaker relief. '
2. Missouri Legislation
A large number of states have adopted differential tax assessment
22
programs for the preservation of agricultural and open space lands.
Missouri became a member of this group in July of 1975 with the passage
of the Agricultural Valuation and Assessment Act. 23 This act adopts the
preferential assessment approach to differential assessment. It directs the
assessor to assess land which is actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural use at its use-value.2 4 Land is deemed to be in agricultural use when it
is devoted to the production for sale of plants and animals. It is deemed to
be in horticultural use when devoted to the production for sale of fruits of
all kinds.25 Before the use-value assessment can be employed, the average
17. See Hagman, supra note 10, at 636.
18. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 426.1 et seq. (West 1971 & Supp. 1976); ONT.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 29 (1970).
19. See Lockner and Kim, Circuit-Breakerson Farm-Property-TaxOverload: A
Case Study, 26 NAT. TAx J. 233 (1973).
20. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 554.710 (Supp. 1975).
21. Id.
22. At least 35 states have such programs. See Hansen & Schwartz, Landowner

Behavior at the Rural-Urban Fringe in Response to PreferentialProperty Taxation, 51
LAND ECON. 341 (1975); T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 14.
23. §§ 137.017-137.026, RSMo (1975 Supp.).
24. § 137.017(1), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
25. § 137.012(2), (3), RSMo (1975 Supp.).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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gross sales of agricultural or horticultural products from the land in question must have been at least $2,500 (or clear evidence of anticipated gross
26
sales of such an amount must be produced) for a period of five years.
Land which satisfies the above requirements is not automatically assessed at
its use-value, however. To qualify his land for such a valuation an owner
must apply to the county assessor by October 1 of the year preceding the
year in which the use-value assessment is to be made. 27 Once the land is
established as qualified, the land must be assessed at its use-value.
Land which is eligible for use-value assessment remains eligible as long
as the owner retains the land in any qualifying use. 2s The landowner must
certify before March 1 of each year that the use of the land or of any part of
the land has not been changed to a nonqualifying use. If there has been a
change to a nonqualifying use or if the owner fails to file the certification,
the assessor must reassess the land, presumably as of January 1 of the year
in which certification is required. 29 This is the only penalty for changing to
a nonqualifying use.
So long as the land remains in a qualifying use, the landowner may sell
or otherwise transfer the land without jeopardizing the eligibility of the
land under the statute.30 In addition, if one part of a parcel of land which is
receiving use-value assessment is sold or converted to a nonqualifying use,
this does" . . . not impair the right of the remaining land to continuance
of valuation and assessment for general property tax purposes . ."31 at its
value for agricultural or horticultural use.
The Missouri statute directs that in valuing qualified land the assessor
"shall consider only those indicia of value which the land has for agricultural or horticultural use. '3 2 These indicia of value include the assessor's
personal knowledge, judgment, and experience; soil survey data; economic
factors; parity ratios; and relevant recommendations of the state tax commission. 3 The statute requires the state tax commission annually to determine and publish a range of values for each of the several classifications of
land in agricultural use within the state.34 The commission must make
these ranges of fair value available to the assessors of each county before
January 1 of each year. The ranges of value may reflect return to land
26. § 137.017(4), RSMo (1975 Supp.). If the land lies contiguously along two
sides of a county or township line, the $2,500 minimum requirement applies to the
entire parcel of land rather than separately to two tracts. § 137.121(4), RSMo (1975
Supp.).
27. § 137.019(1),(2), RSMo (1975 Supp.). The application must contain a
notarized affidavit that the facts set forth are true.
28. § 137.023, RSMo (1975 Supp.).
29. § 137.023, RSMo (1975 Supp.).
30. § 137.019(3), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
31. § 137.021(3), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
32. § 137.021(1), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
33. Id.
34. § 137.026, RSMo (1975 Supp.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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capitalized at a 7% rate.35 Although the statute does not clearly explain the
meaning of this provision, it seems to indicate that the state tax commission
can determine returns to the land, i.e., net income per acre reduced by that
income attributable to factors other than the land itself, capitalize these
returns by dividing them by 7%, and then utilize the resulting figures as
one factor affecting the commission's determination of a range of values.35
B.

Eligibility Requirements

There are a variety of features common to the many differential
assessment programs now in operation. Several such features relate to
qualification requirements which must be met before a landowner can
utilize the applicable program. These requirements involve such matters as
acreage, landowner income, a history of agricultural use, and the process
of application to the program.
1. Acreage
A number of states require that a landholding be a minimum number
of acres before it can qualify for differential assessment.3 7 This acreage is
normally required to be contiguous. A minimum acreage requirement
arguably deters conversion of land use, since conversion of large blocks of
land may result in significant reassessments. But even this effect is eliminated by the operation of a split-off provision such as appears in the
Missouri statute. A split-off provision allows conversion or sale of part of
the land without a reassessment or rollback penalty to the remaining land.
Early versions of the Missouri legislation required a minimum tract of ten
acres, although no such provision now appears in the statute.
2.

Income

At least fourteen states require that the farm owner derive some
percentage of his income from his farmland.3 8 The purpose of this requirement is to make the benefits of use-value assessment available to bona fide
farmers but not to non-farmer speculators. Alaska requires that the landowner derive one-fourth of his income from his farmland. Minnesota is
even stricter, requiring that the farm be the farmowner's homestead or that
35. Id.
36. The State Tax Commission of Missouri has established seven categories of
farmland, based on soil quality and potential productivity. These categories are
defined as seven different soil grades. Grade I soil is to have an assessed value of
$116 per acre. Grade 7 soil is to have an assessed value of $10 per acre. Letter from
State Tax Commission to Senators, Representatives, Assessors, and County Clerks,
containing a copy of guidelines, application, and definitions for application of the
act (August, 1975).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 9, § 8329 (Supp. 1976); KY. REV. STAT. §
132.010(7) (Supp. 1976).
38. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 1, at 22.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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it have been in his family's possession for seven years.3 9
Minimum gross income requirements are often criticized because they
apply irrespective of acreage, thereby permitting large landholders with
only a nominal farm income to qualify alongside bona fide farmers. The
Missouri statute is of this variety. It requires only that the land yield gross
sales of $2,500 per year from agricultural or horticultural products (or that
there be clear evidence of anticipated sales of this amount) regardless of
acreage. 40 This gross sales requirement somewhat offsets the absence of the
minimum acreage requirement, since a minimum number of acres is necessary to produce $2,500 worth of products. Several states have attempted to
tailor the income requrement so that non-farm landholders cannot easily
qualify. New Jersey requires $500 of income on the first five acres, plus $5
per tillable acre in excess of five acres, plus $.50 per acre of woodlands and
wetlands. 4 In Minnesota gross farm income must be $300 plus $10 per
tillable acre, or it must constitute one-third of total family income.4 2 Hawaii
and Utah also require a minimum average return per acre. 43 Other states
require that a certain percentage of the owner's gross income derive from
44
participating land.
3.

Prior Use

Another common type of requirement for eligibility is that the land
have been in a qualifying use for a minimum number of years prior to
participation in the differential assessment program. 45 This tends to reduce the participation of speculators in differential assessment programs
because the landowner must affirmatively show a continuous, active engagement in farming over some time period. The Missouri law appears to
require five years of prior use, although it is confusingly and poorly written
46
on this point.
4.

Application

The majority of states which have use-value assessment statutes require an affirmative application to the program by the landowner before
his land becomes eligible. Missouri is one of these. Several states allow the
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 (West Supp. 1976). See W. Bryant, Farmland
Preservation Alternatives in Semi-Suburban Areas, A.E.Ext. 75-5, Dept. of Agric.
Econ., Cornell U. (April 1975).
40. § 137.017(4), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.5 (West Supp. 1975).
42. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 (West Supp. 1976).
43. HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-12(a) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-89
(Supp. 1975).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035(c) (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
84-437.2(1)(b) (Supp. 1975).
45. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.1 (Supp. 1975); OR. REV. STAT. §
308.370 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.461 (Supp. 1976).
46. § 137.019(1), RSMO (1975 Supp.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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initial applications to be automatically renewable. 47 Many states, including
Missouri, require annual renewal.4 8 Others require less frequent renewal,
49
such as North Dakota where the period between renewals is five years.

C. Valuation
A serious practical problem encountered in the implementation of any
differential assessment program is that of determining the value of land
used as farmland. In practice, the majority of states (and provinces in
Canada) providing for use-value farmland assessments furnish the assessor
with some guideline for determining farm value.50 Maryland maintains
that "farm use-value" is the value of agricultural lands located away from
urban development and speculative influences. 5 ' Arizona has a variable
ratio by which appraised values are multiplied by a special factor to arrive
at an assessed value.5 2 Oregon has established special criteria whereby
assessors must value farmland. One of these criteria is the capitalization of
53
farm income.
Capitalization of income and the use of soil productivity ratings are
two of the most commonly accepted approaches to the valuation of farmland. Income for farmland appraisal purposes generally takes two forms. It
can be rent receipts for the use of the land when someone other than the
owner is doing the farming, or it can be an owner-operator's net income
after all costs but land costs have been paid. A capitalized value is derived
by dividing the income figure by a percentage figure representing a
reasonable return on investment, such as seven or eight percent. Alternatively, the assessor can base his appraisal on estimated soil productivity.5 In
Maryland, the Soil Conservation Service has classified all the farmland in
55
the state into six capability classes based on potential yield of corn crops.
The Missouri state tax commission has established seven categories of
farmland based on soil quality and potential productivity. 56 These
categories may reflect returns to land at a capitalized value of seven percent
57
per acre.
There may be a question whether the presence of minerals or other
47. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-484(D) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §
59-5-89 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.34.060 (Supp. 1975).
48. § 137.023, RSMo (1976 Supp.).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-27 (Supp. 1975).
50. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 1, at 16.
51. MD. ANN. CODE, art 81, § 19(b) (Supp. 1976). See also Henke, supra note 7.
52. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 42-227 (Supp. 1976).
53. OR. REV. STAT. § 308.345 (1975).
54. For a good discussion of land capability classification systems see J. Barron, Open Space Taxation: Guidelines for Assessing Open Space Property Values
(Coop. Ext. Serv., Wash. St. U., 1971).
55. See R.

GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENT: THEORY, PRAC-

at 59 (1974).
56. See note 36 supra.
57. § 136.026, RSMo (1976 Supp).

TICE AND IMPACT,
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8

Lapping et al.: Lapping: Differential Assessment and Other Techniques to Preserve Missouri's Farmlands
DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT

1977]

valuable resources underneath the surface should be considered by the
assessor in valuing farmland. So long as land use controls prevent the
exploitation of these resources, it seems reasonable that any increase in
market value should be ignored.5 8 Attempts to recover minerals from
underground should be deemed to be incompatible and nonqualifying
uses, so that even if the statutory requirements are met, e.g., minimum
agricultural income, the land would become ineligible.
D. Rollback and Deferred Taxes
All differential assessment programs, whether preferential assessment, tax deferral, or restrictive agreement, contain particular provisions
governing eligibility of land and methods of use-value appraisal. Tax
deferral and restrictive agreement programs further provide for governmental recovery of property tax savings that result from assessing land at
its use-value rather than its market value. Under a typical tax deferral
statute, a rollback tax is imposed when land being assessed at its value for
farm or other specific purposes is converted to an unqualified use. This tax
is levied against the tax savings which resulted from using the deferred
taxation program. 59
This rollback tax is only one form of penalty imposed under the tax
60
deferral statutes to recover tax savings, although it is the most common.
Some states charge interest in addition to the rollback taxes. 6 1 Other states
impose a penalty in addition to the rollback tax if the landowner changes
the land use without giving proper notification to governmental authorities. 62 In California the penalty for breaking the agreement not to
change the use of the land is that the owner must pay 12.5 percent of the
fair market value of the land. 63 New Hampshire imposes a tax of 10
64
percent of full cash value on open space land which loses its classification.
Connecticut levies a so-called conveyance tax on sales of land assessed at
use-value. 65 In its efforts to reduce the amount of land leaving agricultural
production, Vermont has adopted an agressive capital gains tax on shortterm land transfers. 66 The tax liability for a change in use attaches to the
58. See Hagman, supra note 10, at 649.

59. See R.

GLOUDEMANS,

supra note 55, at 19-20.

60. The rollback is employed by at least twenty-four states. One example is
VA. CODE § 58-769.10 (Supp. 1976).
61. These include Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Rhode Island, Virginia,
and Washington. See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 55, at 21.
62. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 55, at 20. The penalty varies from 10 percent
of the amount of rollback in North Carolina to up to 100 percent in Utah.
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51283 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975).
64. NEw HAMP. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-A:7 (Supp. 1973).
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-504a, 12-504e (West Supp. 1976). The tax
operates on a sliding scale, ranging from 10 percent of the sales price if the land is
sold during the first year of acquisition or use-value assessment, whichever is first,
and declining one percentage point each subsequent year until no tax is imposed
after the tenth year.
66. See Note, State Taxation-Use of the Taxing Power to Achieve Environmental
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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land rather than to the owner. Therefore, if a transferee of property
continues to farm the land, no rollback tax will be applied. If the transferee
decides to devote the land to a non-farm use, the land will be subjected to
the rollback penalty." Clearly the assessment practices applied to the land
of any selling owner will be important to a prospective purchaser.68 Thus a
complete system of recordation seems essential for the free transfer of real
estate in an area where a differential assessment program utilizing tax
deferral is in operation.
E.

ConstitutionalConsiderations

Differential assessment programs have encountered serious constitutional difficulties. These programs appear to violate state constitutional
provisions which require that land be assessed at its just value, full value,
market value, or true value. 69 In addition, the assessment of farmland at
use-value and other land at market value violates a number of state constitutions which require that property be assessed in an "equal and uniform" manner. 70 Furthermore, even in those states which allow classification of property, differential assessment statutes may be invalidated on the
ground that the classification is unreasonable. These difficulties have normally been addressed by constitutional amendments. 7 1 Wisconsin, however, chose not to amend its constitution in an effort to preserve its forest
lands. Instead, it chose to exempt all forest land from taxes and to tax the
timber when harvested. 72 Hawaii is singular among the states73in that its
constitution never included an "equal and uniform" provision.
Goals: Vermont Taxes Gains Realized From the Sale or Exchange of Land Held Less Than
Six Years VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-10 (1973), 49 WASH. L. REV. 1159
(1974); Baker, Controlling Land Uses and Prices by Using Special Gain Taxation to
Intervene in the Land Market: The Vermont Experiment, 4 ENVT'L AFFAIRS 427-480
(1975).
67.

See R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 55, at 20.
68. The deferred or rollback taxes should be a lien on the real property just as
any other real estate tax. In this case the statute should provide for recordation. See
Hagman, Open Space Planningand PropertyTaxation-Some Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L.
REV. 628, 649.
69. MO. CONST. art. X, § 3(b) provides in part: "Property in classes 1 [real

property] and 2 and subclasses of class 2, shall be assessed for tax purposes at its
value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for
each subclass of class 2."
70. See Rose, Vermont Uses the Taxing Power to Control Land Use, 2 REAL EST.
L.J. 602 (1973); Moore, The Acquisition and Preservationof Open Lands, 23 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 274, 292 (1966); 51 AM. JUR., Taxation §§ 119, 156 (1944).
71. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1(b); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 54:4-23.1 (Supp. 1976). See also Nelson, DifferentialAssessment ofAgricultural
Land in Kansas: A Discussion and Proposal,25 KAN. L. REV. 215 (1977).
72. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 77.03 (1957 & Supp. 1976).
73. HAw. REV. STAT. § 246-12 (1975 Supp.). This has prompted some writers
to comment that Hawaii is one of the few states where land tax policy has truly been
wedded to land use policy. See M. LEVIN, J. RosE, & J. SLAvET. NEW APPROACHES
TO STATE LAND-USE POLICIES 51 (1974); Hagman, The Single Tax and Land-Use
Planning:Henry Goerge Updated, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 762, 782-788 (1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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The risk that a court will find that a differental assessment program
unreasonably classifies property may be reduced by the inclusion of a
preamble stating legislative purposes. 74 A differential assessment law also
may avoid constitutional invalidation if it is construed to create an exemption from taxation instead of creating a classification of property. A court
could find that because the legislature has the power to grant full exemp75
tion from taxation, it has the power to grant partial exemptions.
The urban-rural service district, which involves manipulating the tax
rate rather than the assessment value to grant tax concessions, also might
be used to avert constitutional invalidity. In an urban-rural service district,
the rate of taxation on urban and rural lands within a single taxing jurisdiction depends on the level of services provided. Therefore, if an area within
a political unit is rural or agricultural in nature, it can be designated as such
and taxed at a lower rate. This technique was held valid in Tennessee
76
despite the presence of a state uniformity of taxation clause.
The chances that an agricultural or open land taxation statute will be
held constitutional are improved if the statute provides that the land be
burdened by a use restriction. If the land is restricted by law to agricultural
use and the restriction cannot easily be removed, the market value might
well coincide with the agricultural use-value. If the restricted open land is
valued in the market differently than unrestricted open land, the assessment will in fact be based on fair market value rather than use-value and
will not violate uniform or market valuation requirements of state con77
stitutions.
A tax deferral statute is less likely to be held unconstitutional than a
preferential assessment statute. 78 In theory a tax deferral statute only
delays payment of a part of the tax, so that this may not constitute a lack of
uniformity. Furthermore, there is an assessment made at market value
which is satisfied at the time the deferred taxes are due and payable. 79 A
preferential assessment statute makes no provision for later payment of
current tax savings. This possible advantage of tax deferral over preferential assessment is somewhat diluted by the fact that tax deferral statutes
typically provide for only a partial payment of the taxes which were saved
prior to the conversion of the land out of a qualifying use.
Two of these constitutional issues are particularly important in Missouri. First, the Argicultural Valuation and Assessment Act probably vio74. See Moore, supra note 70, at 292.
75. See Hagman, supra note 68, at 643. See also Judge Prescott's dissent in
State Tax Commission v. Wakefield, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960).
76. See Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565,360 S.W.2d 449 (1962). See also Freilich
& Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The EssentialBasisfor Effective Regional
Planning:An Analysis of the New Directionsfor Land Use Control in the Minneapolis -St.
Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1076-77 (1974).
77. See Hagman, supra note 68, at 644-5,
78. See Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 76, at 1076.
79. See Hagman, supra note 68, at 645.
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lates the Missouri constitutional provisions requiring uniformity of taxation and assessment at market value. Second, the Act probably unconstitutionally sub-classifies real property.
The constitution classifies taxable property as follows:
• . .class 1, real property; class 2, tangible personal property;
class 3, intangible personal property. The general assembly, by
general law, may provide for further classification within classes 2
and 3, based solely on the nature. . . residence or business of the
owner, or the amount owned.80
This language seems to imply that the general assembly cannot create
sub-classifications of real property (class one) for purposes of taxation. The
Supreme Court of Missouri so interpreted this section in 1961:
An intentional plan or design of discrimination by which one kind
or class of property is systematically assessed at a higher percentage of its value than other property in the county works a constructive8 fraud upon each property owner thus discriminated
against.
Although in this case the court was dealing with timberland valuation
practices rather than legislation, the ruling suggests the invalidity of the
Agricultural Valuation and Assessment Act.
The Missouri constitution states that property "shall be assessed
for tax purposes at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed
by law for each class ... ."82 Case law indicates that the value or
percentage of value used should be the market value based on the general
mass of other taxable property in the county.8 3 This suggests that agricultural lands cannot be assessed on a basis other than fair market value, such
as use-value. It may be that in an area where the general mass of land is
devoted to agriculture and there is little likelihood of significant development, fair market value will coincide with use-value for farming. Even in
this situation, however, fair market value is the basis for assessment rather
than use-value, regardless of whether the two values are equal.
The Missouri constitution should be amended so that differential
assessment legislation would be of unquestionable validity. House Joint
Resolution 36, which was submitted during the same legislative session in
which the Agricultural Valuation and Assessment Act (then known as
Senate Bill 203) was passed, would have begun the process to amend the
constitution to remove any constitutional clouds from differential assess80. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 4(a). See R. Bevins & J. Looney, Differential Assessment in Missouri?, Considerations for Community Decision Making, U. Mo. Columbia Ext. Div. No. 5061 (December, 1972).
81. Drey v. State Tax Comm'n, 345 S.W.2d 228, 237 (Mo. 1961). See also
Koplar v. State Tax Comm'n, 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1959); Cupples Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo. 1959).
82. MO. CONsT. art X, § 4(b).
83. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kahler v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 S.W.2d 460, 465
(Mo. 1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2

12

Differential AssessmentASSESSMENT
and Other Techniques to Preserve Missouri's Farmlands
1977]Lapping et al.: Lapping:
DIFFERENTIAL

ment legislation.8 4 Unfortunately, this resolution died in committee.
The use of an amendment to remove any constitutional questions is
not without precedent in Missouri. Before enacting the Missouri State
Forestry Law85 the legislature apparently considered a constitutional
amendment necessary so that special tax treatment for forestry and certain
other lands be clearly valid. This amendment allowed partial relief from
taxation for lands devoted exclusively to forestry. The language of that
amendment might be used as a model for an amendment validating differential assessment for lands devoted to agricultural and horticultural use. It
provides:
Section 7. For the purpose of encouraging forestry when lands are
devoted exclusively to such purpose, and the reconstruction, redevelopment and rehabilitation of obsolete, decadent or blighted
areas, the general assembly by general law may provide for such
partial relief from taxation of the lands devoted to any such
purpose, and of the improvements thereon, by such method or
methods, for such period or periods of time, not exceeding
twenty-five years in any instance, and upon such terms,
conditions, and restrictions as it may prescribe; provided, however, that in the case of forest lands, the
8 6 limitation of twenty-five
years herein described shall not apply.
III.

AN EVALUTION OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT
AND THE MISSOURI STATUTE

An evaluation of a differential assessment program begins with a
consideration of the objectives of that program. The two most commonly

cited purposes for the adoption of differential programs are to provide
property tax relief to farmers when real estate market values are rising and
to encourage farmland owners to retain their land in agricultural uses. One
must also consider the cost of the program and other consequences that
may ensue when such a program is implemented.

A.

A Method to Provide Tax Relief to Farmers

It is generally accepted that in most states agricultural assessments are
low in relation to other real estate assessments. One reason for this is that as
84. House Joint Resolution no.36, which was introduced in the first regular
session of the 78th General Assembly, proposed amendment of article X of the
constitution by adding a new section 16 to read as follows:
Section 16. For the purpose of encouraging the agricultural and horticul-

tural use of land, the general assembly may by general law provide for
such partial relief from taxation of the lands devoted to such purpose, by
any method or methods, for such period of time, and upon such terms,
conditions, and restrictions as the general assembly may prescribe.
85. Chapter 254, RSMo 1969. The statute provides partial tax relief and, in
particular, it sets fixed assessments per acre for privately owned lands classified as
forest croplands. § 254.090, RSMo (1976 Supp.).
86. Mo. CONsT. art X, § 7.
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a matter of practice much agricultural property is assessed on a use-value
or modified use-value basis rather than a market value basis regardless of
differential assessment laws. A 1972 report of the U.S. Department of
Commerce indicates that farmland acreage is generally underassessed
more than other real estate in states without use-value legislation than it is
in states with such legislation.8 7 This appears to be the situation in Missouri
also. Several months after use-value assessment was adopted in Missouri
the chairman of the state tax commission indicated that farmers in rural
areas of Missouri had not sought participation because this would normally
increase the assessed value as then applied by the local assessing officials. 88
However, participation of farmland owners near developing areas is signif89
icant, and the benefits of use-value assessment there are evident.
It may be that use-value assessment will only benefit owners in a
transitional area where development is foreseeable but not yet present. 90 In
these areas the inducement to develop or sell farmland for non-farm uses is
not so intense as in currently developing areas. The owner may wish to
continue the agricultural use of his land even though the developmental
value (market value) exceeds the use-value of the farmland. In those areas
where development is relatively unlikely, i.e., in rural areas located far
away from urban centers, the market value of the land will approach the
use-value, and the tax benefits of use-value assessment will be marginal or
nonexistent. 9 1
If the purpose of the program is to provide tax relief for farmers,
preferential assessment is theoretically sufficient without the penalties and
complications of deferred taxation and restrictive agreements. The advantage of deferred taxation and restrictive agreements, particularly those
programs with long deferral or rollback periods, is that they reduce be92
nefits to speculators who have no real interest in farming.
Use-value farmland assessment programs have generally proved effective to relieve farmers on the urban fringe of the tax burden. 93 In Califor87. U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

2 1972

CENSUS OF

34 (pt. 2 1973).
88. Letter from Chairman of State Tax Commission of Missouri to Robert J.
Bevins (Dec. 19, 1975).
89. The chairman also indicated that a large number of applications had been
filed in St. Charles County, Clay County, and Platte County.
90. See Note, PropertyTaxation of Agriculturaland Open SpaceLand, 8 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 158, 189 (1970).
91. See Hagman, supra note 68, at 633; Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, The Legal
Implementation of CoastalZone Management: The North CarolinaModel, 176 DUKE L.J.
1, 28.
GOVERNMENTS

92. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, STATE PROGRAMS FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL
ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND 15 (U.S. Econ. Research Serv. Ag.

Econ. Report No. 256, April 1974); Bevins, Some Thoughts on Taxation to Halt
Urban Sprawl, 39 J. AM. SOC'Y OF FARM MANAGERS AND RURAL APPRAISERS 13
(1975).
93. See Hansen & Schwartz, Landowner Behaviorat the Rural-UrbanFringe in
Response to PreferentialProperty Taxation, 51 LAND ECON. 341, 344 (1975). See also R.
GLOUDEMANS, supra note 55, at 53.
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nia numerous studies have been conducted on landowner practices since
the adoption of a differential assessment program with strict tax deferral
provisions.94 Although the existence of multiple objectives has complicated
evaluation of the performance of the California program, 95 it does appear
that the program has provided significant tax relief in rural areas affected
by speculation. 96 The studies indicate that participation in the program is
much heavier in areas located away from development activity rather than
nearby. 97 This may have occurred because farmland owners near development activity, who anticipate conversion or sale of the land in the near
future, are wary of the stringent tax deferral provisions in the California
program. 98 In one study it was found that most landowners who enrolled in
the program did not expect development to occur within ten years. 99
B.

A Method for Land Use Planning

Use-value assessment programs, whether preferential assessment, tax
deferral, restrictive agreement, or other, have not yet proved to be fully
effective methods to preserve agricultural lands. 0 ° Studies of the California program commonly conclude that the potential effectiveness of differential assessment as a means of reducing both premature conversion out of
agricultural use and urban sprawl is minimal. 10 In fact, the program may
be costing California taxpayers over $50 million per year with little public
benefit to justify it.
The reasons use-value assessment programs have not proved to be
fully effective methods to preserve agricultural lands are varied. One
reason is that owners of lands near population centers, who are most
susceptible to developmental pressures, have been noticeably unwilling to
participate in use-value assessment programs which have significant penalties for conversion to nonqualifying uses.10 2 Judging program effectiveness
94. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51200 et seq. (West 1966 & Supp. 1977). See also
Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 93; Gustafson and Wallace, DifferentialAssessment as
Land Use Policy: The CaliforniaCase, 41 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 379 (1975); Note,

supra note 90.
95. See Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 94, at 387.
96. Id.

97. See Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 93, at 345; Note, supra note 90, at 190.
See also note 102 and accompanying text infra.
98. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51283 (West 1966 & Supp. 1977).
99. See Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 93, at 348.
100. A study in Maryland has concluded that preferential tax treatment alone
has little effect on conversion decisions. Washington Center for Metropolitan
Studies, Taxation and Development, The Use of Tax Policies for Preserving Open
Space and Improving Development Patterns in the Bi-County Region 8, 19 (1968).

See also Carman & Poison, Tax Shifts Occurringas a Result of DifferentialAssessment of
Farmland:California, 1968-69, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 449, 455 (1971). As for restrictive
agreements, see R. FELLMETH, POLITICS OF LAND at 40-41 (1973).

101. Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 93, at 351; Gustafson and Wallace, supra
note 94, at 387.

102. See PropertyTax Relief and Reform Act of 1973: Hearingson S. 1255 before the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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by high participation close to urban areas may be misleading, however,
because high enrollment of otherwise developable land near urban areas
may encourage a leapfrog development which exacerbates sprawl, pro10 3
duces unsightly areas, and increases the cost of providing public services.
Another reason is that any tax consessions are largely over-shadowed
by opportunities associated with development. This is due to several factors. First, any penalties imposed by a rollback tax are usually quite small
relative to developmental opportunities. Because the size of the penalty
depends on the divergence of market value from use-value, the larger the
potential rollback penalty, the larger the potential capital gain associated
with sale or land use conversion. In addition, rollback taxes or other
deferred taxes will be deductible expenses for federal income tax purposes. 104 Second, the amount of these penalties is frequently less than the
amount of the tax which the owner has saved. Thus, he will never pay more
taxes than he would if he were not in the program, and he will often pay
less. If there is no interest penalty on the deferred tax, he will also gain free
use of the money involved.
A third reason why use-value assessment is not an effective land use
control device is that assessment of high quality farmland at higher usevalues than poor land makes the conversion of the better farmland more
likely, because the better land will be subject to smaller deferred or rollback
taxes. 05 A farmer planning on selling all or part of his land upon retirement also may be discouraged from continuing operations and thus decide
to sell his land, because the accrued tax obligations will lower the market
10 6
value of his land.
If the purpose of the program is to influence land use, preferential
assessment is a poor device. In fact, it may be the least effective method for
land use control.' 07 It imposes no responsibility on the landowner to maintain an agricultural use of the land. Since it is available to any landowner
who meets the requirements, it may frustrate broad planning procedures.
Several states in recent years appear to have found preferential assessment
laws unsatisfactory and have moved toward either deferred taxation or
08
restrictive agreements.
Subcomm. on Intergov'tal Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
93d Cong.; 1st Sess., 813-16 (1973).
103. Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 93, at 351-52. See also R. BEVINS & M.
LAPPING, PUBLIC TOoLS FOR INFLUENCING LAND USE, (U. Mo. - Columbia Extension Div, no. 8506, April 1976).
104. See Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, supra note 91, at 33.
105. See Henke, PreferentialProperty Tax Treatment for Farmland, 53 ORE. L.
REV. 117, 128 (1974).
106. R.

GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENTS: THEORY, PRAC-

TICE, AND IMPACT, at

42 (1974).

107. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 92, at 16.
108. Maryland and Connecticut have had preferential assessment laws for
some time but have supplemented them so as to collect additional tax revenue from
land which has been granted preferential assessment and afterwards passed into
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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Tax deferral programs also are less than satisfactory devices to influence land use. Although tax deferral tends to discourage a farmland owner
from converting his land to a nonagricultural use, the only real advantage
to the landowner is a postponement of taxes. If the program is only
voluntary, landowners may shy away from it, fearing an accumulation of
deferred taxes. 10 9 In addition, a tax deferral system may be expensive to
establish and administer." 0
It is not clear whether the rollback tax discourages land speculation.
Probably it does not."1 ' Any hope for the prevention of a land use change
depends upon the participating farmer being so penalized in the form of a
lower sales price that he is discouraged from selling. Only in this regard can
the rollback tax be considered an encouragement, and then not a guarantee, for maintaining land in agricultural use.11 2 Certainly the rollback tax
has some marginal effect upon land use. More importantly, it provides
society with a means of recapturing tax concessions which were made
without securing the intended social benefit.
Restrictive agreements, on the other hand, are more likely to accomplish this objective of influencing land use. Restrictive agreements penalize
a change in use, and they are normally closely related to planning objectives because the availability of tax concessions is in control of governmen3
tal authorities."
The Missouri statute has no rollback provision. In this respect the law
is particularly weak as a land use planning device. It provides the possibility
4
of large tax savings for speculators without a compensatory obligation."
The Missouri statute also allows a landowner to change the use of part of
his land without forfeiting the eligibility for preferential assessment on the
rest of his land. Allowing landowners to enjoy a tax subsidy while reaping
profits derived from the conversion of property out of agricultural use may
have damaging effects on efficient agricultural production. Increasingly,
researchers have come to believe that a certain "critical mass" of land is
necessary for efficient agricultural production and the economies of scale
nonqualifying uses. MD. ANN. CODE art, 81, § 19(b) (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-107c (1958 & Supp. 1976). Florida has a preferential assessment program for farmland. But when this program was extended to outdoor recreation and
parkland, it provided for restrictive agreements. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.501(1)

(West Supp. 1976).
109. See Williams, The Property Tax on Forest Land and Timber, Taxation

and Conservation of Privately Owned Timber 67 (Bureau of Bus. Research, U. of
Ore. 1959).
110. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 92, at 16.
111. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 106, at 42.
112. Id.
113. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 92, at 16.
114. There was an effort to have a rollback provision attached to the legislation

before it was enacted. The major sponsor of the bill as passed said himself, "[I]f
it appears that law is being abused, I would be the first to come back with something

like a rollback provision." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 27, 1975, at IC.
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to support agribusiness enterprises.1 5 Though this minimum land requirement varies for key crops, continous reduction of the agricultural land base
through split-offs could undermine farming in certain areas. The split-off
provision in the Missouri law seems to frustrate any land use planning
objectives and extends only marginal tax relief to the farmer. The statute
might be improved by requiring that land remaining after a split-off of
part of the land become disqualified for a given period before becoming
eligible for requalification. Perhaps the split-off provision should simply be
eliminated.
Whether or not any use-value assessment program can have a significant effect upon land use, numerous studies indicate that it cannot do the
job alone." 6 Differential assessment cannot be expected alone to curtail
development when the market value of the farmland exceeds its use-value
and conversion to a non-agricultural use is profitable, although use-value
assessment combined with a love for farming or immobilities in the farm
labor and capital markets may influence a landowner to retain his land in
agriculture." 7 Some commentators suggest that one improvement would
be to make a use-value assessment program mandatory for all land under
qualifying uses.118 It may also be an effective control technique if complemented by well-planned agricultural zoning which reduces developmental expectations." 9 In that case, improved land use control should be
attributed to stronger regulation rather than use-value assessment itself.
C.

Costs and Consequences of Differential Assessment

Differential assessment programs are also subject to further criticism.
One such criticism is that differential assessment can cause a reduction in
the tax base of the taxing jurisdiction and thereby reduce local government
revenues in the area. The ability of a county to supply certain services will
be sharply curtailed if a significant amount of land is brought into the
program and if tax rates on nonparticipating land cannot be adjusted
upward enough to compensate for the loss.
One study of the preferential assessment program in Maryland determined that eight counties on the fringes of Baltimore and Washington,
115. See Phillon & Deer, CriticalMass of Agriculture and Maintenance of Productive Open Space, 2 J. NORTHEASTERN AGRICULTURAL ECON. COUNCIL 1, 23-24
(1974); R. Stammer, A Mathematical Programming Model for Industry: With
Empirical Application to the New England Livestock Feed Processing Industry
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Agric. Econ., U. of Conn. 1971).
116. See T. Hady & A. Sibold, supra note 92, at 12. See also W. BRYANT,
FARMLAND PRESERVATION ALTERNATIVES IN SEMI-SUBURBAN AREAS,

A. E. Ext.

75-5, Dept. of Agric. Econ., Cornell U. (April 1975); Note, supra note 90, at 189.
117. R. GLOUDEMANS, supra note 106, at 39. The relationship may be more
complex. See Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 93, at 352.
118. See Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 94, at 387; Hagman, supra note 68, at
648.
119. See Gustafson & Wallace, supra note 94, at 386; Hansen & Schwartz, supra
note 93, at 351.
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D.C. saw a reduction in revenues of approximately 3.6 percent. 120 This
illustrates the need to consider carefully not only the perceived benefits of
a differential assessment program, but also its costs, when comparing it to
other methods of land use control. California reimburses local taxing
jurisdictions for revenue lost through use-value assessment. Missouri also
lieu of taxes foregone by
makes compensatory payments, but only in
21
differential assessment of forest croplands.'
Differential assessment also raises the property tax burden on nonfarm landowners. 122 This effect is reduced under deferred taxation
schemes, since the burden shifts as land is changed from a qualifying use to
a nonqualifying use. A 1973 study in New Jersey indicates that state's
differential assessment program shifted some $48 million in taxes from
farmers to non-farmers. This represented nearly a $50 per acre shift in
assessment rates. 123 While a study of the Connecticut differential assess124
ment system suggests that there has been little shift in the tax burden,
this was largely the result of statewide development and growth which
offset the loss of revenues.
It is further argued that differential assessment programs which are
applied on a statewide basis unnecessarily benefit strictly rural land by
giving equal preferential treatment to land which is well beyond the pressures of urban development as well as to land directly bordering urban
areas. 125 This argument overlooks the fact that the market value is closer to
use-value for farmland not subject to developmental pressures. Consequently, tax savings are less.
Another aspect of the costs inherent in a differential assessment program is the many administrative problems which must be faced. Agricultural uses and other qualifying uses must be defined. Many determinations
must be made as to compliance with eligibility requirements. Criteria for
determining use-value must be developed, and in the case of tax deferral,
market value assessments as well as use-value assessments must be made.
The essential policy issue that emerges from these considerations is
120. Revenues to Montgomery County in Maryland in the amount of the tax
loss could have supported a vigorous public land acquisition program. See House,
Differential Assessment of Farm Land Near Cities, Experience in Maryland
Through 1965, Econ. Research Serv., U.S.D.A. ERS-358 at 24 (1967).
121. § 254.110, RSMo 1969.
122. See T. HADY & A. SIBOLD, supra note 92, at 13. For a good discussion of
shifting tax burdens, see Henke, supra note 105, at 124; Carman & Polson, supra
note 100.
123. See T. Kolestar &J. Scholl, Misplaced Hopes, Misspent Millions: A Report

on Farmland Assessments in New Jersey, in Differential Assessment of Farmland
and Open Space (Princeton, N.J.: The Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 1972).
124. Fellows, The Impact of Public Act 490 on Agricultural and Open Space in

Connecticut, Seminar on Taxation of Agricultural and Other Open Land, Mich. St.
U. Coop. Ext. Serv. (1971).
125. See Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, supra note 91, at 28.
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who will pay for the benefits perceived from land use control. Land use
controls, particularly those aimed at "open spaces," seem to generate widely dispersed and generally small increments of benefit. The direct costs of
land use control, on the other hand, may be highly concentrated. The costs
fall upon the few owners whose land use options are limited, the local
government that loses property tax base, and the region that sees limits on
126
its potential for development.
Differential assessment laws can be justified on a basis of promoting
tax equity if the laws are so written that only the intended persons are
eligible to receive the benefits of use-value assessment. But several studies
suggest that the greatest benefits have gone to wealthy corporate landowners rather than to needy farmers. 127 If tax relief or the promotion of tax
equity is to be an objective of such a program, the objective must be
precisely delineated so that the program can be designed effectively.
IV.

OTHER APPROACHES To PRESERVING LAND IN AGRICULTURE

The value of differential assessment programs to preserve land in
agriculture is questionable at best. Many differential assessment statutes
seem to have tax favoritism as the main purpose rather than effective
control of land use in the public interest. Other methods, being suggested
and implemented elsewhere, may hold promise in terms of ability to
preserve the resource base.
A.

Zoning

Perhaps the most familiar form of land use control is traditional
zoning, whereby local governmental authorities attempt to regulate the
pattern of development through exercise of the state's police power. The
constitutionality of zoning as a permissible use of the police power was
upheld in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 128 Governmental
authorities cannot, however, impair a landowner's rights unreasonably on
the basis of the police power alone. 29 This constitutional limitation of
reasonableness is particularly important in view of the courts' general
126. See Libby, Land Use Policy: Implicationsfor CommercialAgriculture, 56 AM.
1143, 1150 (1974).
127. See, e.g., Subcommittee Chairman'sReport to Subcommittee No.1, House Select
Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Tax Exempt Foundations and
Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy iii (1967); Gustafson & Wallace,
supra note 94, at 387. However, another study indicated a strong tendency of
corporate landowners to avoid participation in the California program. Hansen &
Schwartz, supra note 93, at 348.
128. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928).
129. Robinson v. Town Council of Narragansett, 60 R.I. 422, 434, 199 A. 308,
313 (1938). See generally, Berger, To Regulate orNot to Regulate-Is That the Question?
Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private
Property Rights, 8 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 253 (1975); Uddo, Land Use Controls: Aesthetics,
Past and Future, 21 Loy. L. REV. 851 (1975).

J.

AGRICULTURAL ECON.
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reluctance to approve of police power regulation to promote aesthetic
objectives, 130 although judicial support of regulation for aesthetic purposes
1
13
has been growing.

The difficulty in relying upon zoning to preserve agricultural land and
other open space is the lack of objective standards for determining whether
the property use restriction is reasonable under the circumstances. 32 It is

clear that regulation need not permit the most profitable use of the land,1 3
but open space regulations often benefit the regulated landowners very
little, and they usually prohibit permanent structural uses. Zoning for open
space purposes thereby restricts land value more severely than does conventional zoning.13 4 Such regulations which impose serious burdens with35
out any compensating benefits are likely to be held unconstitutional.1
However, many open space regulations such as flood plain zoning, building setbacks, and grazing districts do involve reciprocity of benefits and
burdens and are therefore supportable.
One common approach to zoning to preserve agricultural land and
other open space is to adopt minimum lot size regulation. There was a

recent trend toward invalidating large lot zoning in urbanizing surburban
areas on the basis that minimum lot size requirements had the effect of

excluding poor people and racial minorities of which a disproportionate
number are poor. 3 6 This trend has been reversed, and courts now recognize the value of minimum lot zoning as one aspect of comprehensive land
130. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654,
661-62, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925); Bismark v. Bayville, 49 Misc. 2d 604, 267
N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
131. See Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963); State v.
Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); In re Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225
N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). Leighty, Aesthetics As a Legal BasisforEnvironmental Control, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1347-60 (1971). See also Steinbach, Aesthetic
Zoning: Property Values and the JudicialDecision Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176 (1970);
Snadon, Aesthetic Regulation and the Police Power, 35 Mo. L. REV. 445 (1970).
132. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
133. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Reinman v. Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
134. See Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Talking, 57
MINN. L.

REV.

1, 5, 7 (1972).

135. See generally, Dooley v. Town Plan &Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197
A.2d 770 (1964); Hofkin v. Whitemarsh Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 88
Montg. 68, 42 Pa. D&C 2d 417 (Pa.C.P. 1967); Morris County Land Imp. Co. v.
Township of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
136. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J.
Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,268
A.2d 765 (1970). See generally, R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING, LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that exclusionary or discriminatory effects of zoning
alone, with no showing of improper purpose, do not render the zoning regulation
violative of federal constitutional requirements. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977).
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use control. 3 7 Planners can avoid any confiscatory impact on the farmers if
minimum lot size regulation is applied in those areas where development is
not reasonably expected for 15 to 20 years. The farmer retains an
at8 the same time there is no urban use
economic rural use for the land, and 13
for his land of which he is deprived.
Another regulatory method is exclusive agricultural zoning. 8 9 Under
this form of zoning only farming uses are allowed. Therefore, the value of
the land is its value for farming purposes, and the problems of assessments
or appraisals based on non-farm use are eliminated. 140 This type of regulation is more likely than minimum lot zoning to be deemed an unreasonable
confiscation because the impact of permitting only one use is so severe.
There will almost certainly be parcels of land in the zoning area not suitable
for agriculture, and they will be regulated into uselessness.
A third approach to zoning is compensable zoning.14 ' Although this
method involves more than simple regulation, it has been held a valid
exercise of both the police power and of eminent domain. 42 An owner is
compensated for the loss of the development value of his property due to
restrictions imposed under the police power. Compensation is based on
development value at the time the restrictions are imposed for open space
purposes, but the owner is not eligible to receive compensation until he
sells the property. The rationale is that he has incurred no loss before he
sells.' 43 Condemnation costs are paid by assessing those within the planning
district who are benefited by the regulation. The benefit assessment allows
a recapture of some of the planning benefits and their redistribution to
137. See Steelhill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 P.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1972); Salamar Builders, Inc. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325
N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971); Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344
(Colo. 1972).
138. See Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential
Basis for Effective Regional Planning:An Analysis of the New Directionsfor Land Use
Control in the Minneapolis - St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009,
1064-65 (1974).
139. Santa Clara County in California and Lancaster County in Pennsylvania
have both made extensive and effective use of agricultural zoning. See W. WHYTE,
SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 23
(1959). See also Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methodsfor ControllingCommunity Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 370; Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary Zoning:
Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URB. LAW. 344 (1971).
140. See W. Bryant, Farmland Preservation Alternatives in Semi-Suburban
Areas, A.E.Ext. 75-5, April 1975, Dept. of Ag. Econ., Cornell U. (April 1975).
141. See generally Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservationof Open Space in MetropolitanAreas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1961); Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable
Regulationsfor Open Space, 29 J. AM. INST. PLANNER 87 (1963).
142. See Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969). Compare Otto v.
Steinhilber, 382 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939), with Fulling v. Palumbo, 21 N.Y.2d
30, 233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967), and Kenyon v. Quinones, 43 App,
Div.2d 125, 350 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1973).
143. See Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketability of Development
Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635, 638 (1974).
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those suffering injury. 144 Administrative problems and costs of condemnation may make such a technique unduly expensive in some areas. However,
the theory of compensable regulation paves the way for the concepts of
public purchase of development rights and development rights transfer,
which have received a great deal of attention.
Through state zoning enabling legislation at least twenty-one states
have reserved for local governments the power to zone land for agricultural use. 145 While much of this legislation was passed to allow creation of
exclusive agricultural districts, such programs have not proved to be as
popular as those which provide for other land uses in predominantly
agricultural zones. This type of non-exclusive zoning apparently has resulted largely from pressure from the farmers and the desire on the part of
local governments to placate agricultural interests.1 46 The consequence is a
loss of effectiveness of zoning as a technique to preserve agricultural land.
Hawaii has adopted an effective program of exclusive agricultural
zoning. All the land in the state has been assigned to urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation districts, and zoning ordinances in the agricultural
districts are based on agricultural use. The good results achieved in Hawaii
may depend, however, on elements peculiar to tropical agriculture and the
unique State Land Use Plan.
California has adopted a greenbelt zoning statute which differs from
traditional zoning in that the owner's consent is required to restrict land to
exclusively agricultural use. The statute provides that any land which is
zoned, by the consent of its owners, exclusively for agricultural use pursuant to a master plan cannot be annexed to a city without the owner's
consent. 147 This statute is not sufficient for effective comprehensive planning, because the greenbelt restriction can be removed if the owner obtains
approval of the county supervisor. In addition, an owner in a greenbelt
area who has not consented to the restriction is free to develop his land. 48
The most significant weakness of zoning as a land use control device,
constitutional issues aside, is that even the most carefully prepared zoning
map may be overwhelmed by variances, zoning amendments, and special
exceptions.149 As development approaches the area, speculators who anticipate the granting of variances will cause increases in market value and
assessment value, resulting in an increasing property tax burden on the
144. See Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 138, at 1069.
145. See E. Solberg & Pfister, Rural Zoning in the United States: Analysis of

Enabling Lesislation, U.S.D.A. Econ. Research Serv. Misc. Pub. No. 1232, (1972).
146. See J. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1967).
147. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 35009 (West 1968).
148. See Note, Preservationof Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt
STAN. L. REV. 638 (1960).
149. See. Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, The Legal Implementation of Coastal Zone
Management: The North Carolina Model, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1, 19; Sterch, The Zoning

Zoning, 12

Variance, A New Look in Missouri?, 34 Mo. L.

REV.

631 (1969).
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landowners.' 50 Another drawback is that zoning decisions are normally
controlled by politically vulnerable local government authorities. Finally,
lack of coordination of policies among different political subdivisions with
or
conflicting interests and the absence of mandatory state guidelines
15 1
supervision can easily frustrate comprehensive regional planning.
The integration of a use-value assessment program with a zoning
scheme can influence the pattern and timing of development. A growing
number of commentators argue that either method or both in combination
should not represent an unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional use
of public regulatory powers.' 52 All land within a specified area can be
zoned exclusively for open space and agricultural uses and can be designated by the county as an agricultural preserve, making all land within the
zoned area eligible for assessment at use-value. In this situation, zoning is
much less vulnerable to the "unfair taxation" argument. Arguments for
zoning variances or changes are much weaker when a landowner can avoid
rising property taxes by applying for use-value assessment. 153 Both California and Oregon have integrated zoning with a differential assessment
154
program.
B.

Fee Simple Purchase and Leaseback

When zoning regulation proves to be inadequate to control land use,
politically unacceptable, or constitutionally unacceptable, governmental
authorities might simply purchase the land by exercising their power of
eminent domain.'55 The Missouri Open Space Conservation Act authorizes
certain state political subdivisions to acquire from private persons various
interests in real property for open space purposes, either through voluntary transfer or the exercise of eminent domain. 15 6 These subdivisions may
150. See Hagman, Open Space Planningand PropertyTaxation-Some Suggestions,
1964 WIs. L. REV. 628, 631; Rusler, supra note 134; Moore, The Acquisition and
Preservationof Open Lands, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 274 (1966).
151. See Henke, supra note 105, at 129; W. Bryant, supra note 140, at 5-7.
152. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971); Hayman, Planningand the Constitution: The Great "PropertyRights" Fallacy, 3
CRY CALIFORNIA 29-35 (Summer 1968).
153. See Gustafson & Wallace, Differential Assessment as Land Use Policy: The
California Case, 41 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 379, 387 (1975).
154. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51220 (West 1966); OR. REV. STAT. § 308.370(1)
(1975).
155. R. H. Platt presents an interesting article in which he contends that the
eminent domain power arose out of the power of the English sovereign to preempt
land by fiat, and that the police power is inherited from the "commons," a figurative
or actual assembly of individual tenants whose rights in common opposed economic
pressure towards enclosure. See Platt, Fedual Origins of Open Space Law, 4 LANDUSE CONT. Q. 27 (1970).
156. §§ 67.870, RSMo 1969. The state park board, counties with a population in
excess of 200,000, and cities and counties adjoining such counties may:
acquire by purchase, gift, grant, bequest, devise, or otherwise, the fee,
development right or restrictive covenant, conservation easement, covenhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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also acquire the fee title to any property for the purpose of leasing the
property back to the original owner. There is little doubt concerning the
effectiveness of such a program to preserve open space. 15 7 However, the
usefulness of fee simple purchase is limited by two factors. First, under
both the federal constitution and many state constitutions (including Missouri's) 58 land can only be acquired for a public purpose. Second, outright

purchase is a very expensive method to control land development. 59
Growth control by means of public purchase through the power of
eminent domain requires the acquisition of interests in land well in advance
of actual use. Some jurisdictions have held that excess or future condemnation is not a public purpose. According to this view, acquisition for uses well
beyond those clearly foreseeable may be invalid. 60 Puerto Rico is the only
jurisdiction to have considered a true land banking scheme, which involves
purchasing and holding land without immediately committing it to a
specific future use and then gradually disposing of the land to governmental and private parties.' 6 ' The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico upheld land
banking legislation, finding it well within the limits of public use and
purpose. 162
The high costs of a fee simple purchase program can sometimes be
offset by funds made available through a number of federal government
programs to protect open space.' 63 Alternatively, the governmental agency
can purchase the fee and then lease it back to farmers for farming or to
other private parties for other purposes. The lease back not only reduces
the cost of the program, but may also avoid constitutional difficulty, since
the uses for which such land is acquired are immediate.
As a farmland preservation technique, fee simple purchase and
ant or other contractual right in land or water rights located within such
counties or cities necessary or appropriate to maintain, improve, protect,
limit the future use of, or otherwise conserve and properly utilize open
spaces and areas within such counties or cities.
§ 67.895, RSMo 1969. The act also requires assessors and taxing authorities to take
due account of and assess private property interests with due regard to the limitation of future use of the land. Id.
157. See Rose, supra note 143, at 639.
158. Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 27.
159. See Moore, supra note 150, at 279; Rose, supra note 143, at 639.
160. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Baszewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810
(1954); Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953). See also
Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 138, at 1074-75.
161. See Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, supra note 149, at 34-36. See generally
Fishman, Public Land Banking: Examination of a Management Technique, in 3 MAN-

61 (R. Scott ed., 1975).
162. Commonwealth v. Rosso, 95 P.R.R. 488 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
14 (1968). See also Ruebo v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1967); Carlor Co.
v. Miami, 62 So.2d 897 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953).
163. See, e.g., Cropland Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1838 (1970); Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4601-5 (Supp.II, 1972); Watershed and
Flood Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-05 (Supp.II, 1972).
AGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

leaseback has not had extensive application. In the few instances where
farmland was purchased under a New Jersey program, farmer opposition
was strong and the leaseback procedure was a failure, primarily because
the leaseback period was only one year. 164 On the other hand, in the
province of Saskatchewan over one-half million acres have been purchased
and leased back to farmers. This program is part of a larger rural development effort aimed at aiding the small farmer. The success of this program
may be attritutable to the number of small farmers in the province. Applicants for land cannot have had family annual net incomes averaging over
$10,000 in the prior three year period, nor can an applicant's net worth
during this period have exceeded $60,000.15
Purchase and leaseback programs are beneficial to the farmer in that
estate tax and property tax problems are reduced, and the farmer receives
full compensation for his land. 166 But he loses the pride of ownership and
becomes a rent-paying tenant instead. As a tenant he is less likely to make
substantial investment in machinery, which is often necessary to efficient
agricultural production. Governmental agencies make poor landlords, because they tend to prefer short leaseback periods possibly with competitive
bidding to determine rent levels from one period to the next. Bureaucracies also are notoriously slow to make decisions about such things as
repairs and capital improvement. 167 Another problem is that publicly
owned land may be vulnerable to special interest groups who favor policies
inconsistent with solid farming practices. Finally, expenses of administering the program along with maintaining the public properties could be
prohibitive.
C. Development Rights Acquisition
As an alternative to purchasing the entire fee, local governments may
acquire the rights to develop the land. Such interests are often referred to
in the literature as scenic easements, conservation easements, or simply
164. See W. Bryant, supra note 140, at 16.
165. See Young, The Saskatchewan Land Bank, 40 SASK. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1975).
166. The farmer's tax problems are not eliminated, however. The leasehold is
taxable property, although the value of the leasehold is less than that of the fee. See
Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253 (1956); State ex rel. Benson v.
Personnel Housing, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1957). See also Penn, RealPropertyTaxation of Private Leaseholds in Exempt Government Property, 41 Mo. L. REV. 613
(1976). The federal estate tax has also been a serious problem for farmers. Prior to
1977 real property was assessed at its market value for federal estate tax purposes
whether or not it was assessed at some other value for property tax purposes. There
has been a change due to the Tax Reform Act of 1976. New I.R.C. § 2032A states
that with certain qualification, for purposes of the estate tax the value of qualified
real property shall be its value for the use under which it qualifies. I.R.C. § 2032A.
The term "qualified use" includes devotion of the property to use as a farm for
farming purposes. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2). The value of a farm for farming purposes
is determined by a type of capitalization of income method. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7).
167. See W. Bryant, supra note 140, at 17.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/2
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development rights. 168 Nondevelopmental uses such as farming and grazing normally remain available to the landowner. He retains the fee interest
and transfers to the governmental agency only his right to develop the
land. He keeps all his other rights of ownership, including the right of
possession. The encumbrance runs with the land and binds all subsequent
169
purchasers.
This approach is similar to compensable zoning regulation, where the
governmental authority zones out the right to develop and then compensates the landowner for any losses suffered. However, the costs of compensable zoning, whereby the landowner is not compensated until he sells
the property, are not incurred-as soon as the costs of a development rights
acquisition program, in which the rights are paid for at the time acquired.
On the other hand, compensable regulation is subject to zoning variances,
while easements or development rights are normally acquired in
70
perpetuity.
It is well settled that public acquisition of these rights in land for
conservation and other open space purposes is within the power of eminent domain.' 7 ' However, it may be a requirement for the valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain in purchasing development rights that the
rights and limitations on the owner's use of his restricted land be clearly
specified.17 2 In this respect many enabling acts appear deficient, 73 including the Missouri Open Space Conservation Act which is silent as to the
74
owner's use.1
Public acquisition of development rights presents several advantages
over purchase of the fee. 175 It can be expected that the purchase price will
be somewhat less, since the landowner retains the fee simple. 176 Landown-

168. See W. Whyte, Securing Open Spaces for Urban America: Conservation
Easements, Urban Land Inst. Tech. Bull. no.36 (1959).
169. See Rose, supra note 143, at 640.
170. See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra. See also Moore, supra note 150.
171. See Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668
(1896); Kamrowski v. Wisconsin, 31 Wis.2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966). See also
Ciriacy-Wantrup, The "New" Competition For Land and Some Implicationsfor Public
Policy, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 252, 264-66 (1964); Note, Preservationof Open Spaces
Through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning, 12 STAN. L. REV. 638, 644 (1960).
Both articles discuss whether compensation for easements constitutes a gift of
public funds under the California constitution.
172. Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E.
635, 640 (1922); Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963).
173. See Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9 VILL. L.
REV. 559, 566 (1964).
174. See note 156 supra.
175. See W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE (1968).
176. This has generally been the experience of the Wisconsin Highway Commission in purchasing scenic easements along the Great River Road. See Jordahl,
Conservation and Scenic Easements: An Experience Resume, 39 LAND ECON. 343, 354

(1963).
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ers receive cash in exchange for giving up a right in the land which they
may never have intended to exercise, and they continue as landowners
rather than as tenants. Not only does encumbered property remain on the
property rolls, but when the value of the development rights is low the tax
base will not be significantly reduced. Moreover, the expense of maintaining the property is not transferred to the governmental agency, and the
landowner can continue to put the land to productive, though limited,
use. 77 Another advantage is that the property tax pressures on the owner
will be decreased because the encumbrance causes the assessment to decrease. 78 If the landowner makes a gift to the government of development
rights, a charitable deduction may be taken on his federal income tax
return for a contribution of development rights. 79 This encourages the
landowner to make such a donation, further reducing the government's
cost of acquisition.
There have been two serious impediments to implementation of development rights acquisition programs. First, the general public and local
governing bodies have not fully understood the nature of conservation or
scenic easements as techniques to provide open space. As a result, easements have been difficult to enforce. Damages after the fact for violations
are often inadequate, as, for example, when trees are cut contrary to an
easement agreement.18 0 The difficulties that arise with the implementation
of such a program are illustrated by the experience of the National Park
Service. After acquiring scenic easements for a number of years, the National Park Service discontinued the practice, reporting that, "On the basis
of 20 years of experience, such easements breed misunderstandings, administrative difficulties, are difficult to enforce, and cost only a little less
than the fee."''
The second problem that arises in connection with development rights
programs is that development rights can still be quite expensive, even if
they are more economical than purchasing the entire fee. In rural areas
where development potential is low, such rights should be relatively inexpensive. 8 2 In developing areas where the value of development rights is
higher, not only is the cost of acquisition higher, but the reduction in the
tax base is also more significant. A method to fund an acquisition program
177. Id.
178. Smith, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 728, 735
(1971).

179. Rev. Rul. 73-339, 1973-2 C.B. 68. See also Browne & Dorn, CharitableGifts
of PartialInterest in Real Propertyfor Conservation Purposes, 29 TAx LAw. 69 (1975);
May, The CaliforniaOpen-Space Easement Act: The Efficacy of Indirect Incentives, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 359 (1976).
180. See Eveleth, supra note 173, at 567.
181. H.R. Rep. No. 273, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also Rose, supra note

143, at 641.
182. See Smith, supra note 178, at 741.
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is needed. However, it is often politically difficult to finance acquisition
programs at the local level for such abstract future benefits as open space
when there is need for a new hospital or school. 8 3 Instead, the state is the
logical source of funding assistance. California finances its program by
issuing bonds, 18 4 while Wisconsin funds its highway programs for scenic
and conservation easements by a special one-cent tax on cigarettes.8 5
There is also some funding assistance available from the federal government through the Open Space Land Program of the Department of Hous186
ing and Urban Development.
In drafting development rights agreements one must be careful not to
run afoul of common law doctrines relaing to easements. Under the
common law new types of easements may not be recognized, easements in
gross may not be assignable, and they may be extinguished by merger if
8 7
ownership of the easement and the fee are unified in one person.
Perhaps these development rights should not be referred to as easements
at all.
New York's Suffolk County, situated on Long Island within commuting distance of New York City, has had limited experience with the public
purchase of development rights. 88 The program was adopted in response
to concern about potential over-population, because the demand for residential land was so high. The program has attracted strong support from
county residents. Some perceive it as a way to limit the further growth of
the county. Others see it as a way to guarantee open space. Still others think
it is a way to make sure that plentiful amounts of fresh vegetables and fruit
will be on their tables. The greatest support comes from the farming
community. This is not surprising, since farmers may receive $6,000 per
acre as windfall profits for sale of the rights and at the same time keep their
land. Enthusiasm for the program among non-farmers may be largely
attributed to a high level of public interest in the "quality of life," these
taxpayers' particular ability to afford the high costs of the program, and
89
strong program leadership.1
183. Id. at 744.
184. Id. at 745.
185. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 139.31 (West 1974). See Note, Progress and Problems in
Wisconsin's Scenic and ConservationEasement Program, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 352.
186. Easements must generally be in perpetuity and receive H.U.D. advance
approval to qualify for funding assistance. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HousING

AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A

HUD

GUIDE: GRANTS FOR OPEN SPACE LAND

(1970). See also Smith, supra note 178, at 746-48.
187. See Note, Scenic Easements, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 131, 138 (1971); Note,
Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1622 (1962).
188. The county adopted the program pursuant to statute, N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 247 (McKinney 1974), by passing Local Law No. 19, Local Law Relating to
the Acquisition of Development Rights on Agricultural Lands, Suffolk County,
New York (1974). See Bryant & Conklin, New FarmlandPreservationProgramsin New
York, 41 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 390, 394 (November 1975).
189. See W. Bryant, supra note 140, at 20.
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Transferable Development Rights

It is often difficult to predict when a given land use restriction will be
deemed a permissible exercise of police power regulation and when the
restriction imposed requires compensation as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain. A relatively new technique known as development rights
transfer may provide some resolution to the problem. 9 0 The most common example of this technique is the development district. Under this type
of program a given area is designated as a district. Within the district
certain land (the preservation zone) is kept free of development, while
other land is allowed to be developed at densities greater than otherwise
permitted, so as to absorb the growth being deflected from the preservation zone. Overall development within the district thus can reach the same
density it would have reached without the preservation of open areas.
Development of district land which lies outside the preservation zone
is typically restricted by zoning regulation. However, development of this
land can exceed that permitted by the zoning ordinances if additional
development rights are purchased from landowners in the preservation
zones.' Development rights may be allocated among owners on various
bases such as acreage or value of potential development. They may even be
time-phased. For instance, land ownership may be the source of an annual
grant of generalized development rights. Importation or exportation of
rights among districts would not be allowed generally, as this could easily
frustrate the concept of controlled development.
Under any transferable development rights (TDR) proposal the development rights are freely transferable among private parties or between
a private party and a public intermediary agency at market prices, and the
use of these rights is subject only to a comprehensive land use plan for the
pertinent area.192 A landowner in a preservation zone finds himself owning
land with fewer use alternatives and owning development rights which
s
relate to land he may not own.'
Four types of TDR programs have been proposed. 9 4 The first and
simplest was developed for New York City. Owners of landmarks upon
which further development is prohibited would be allowed to transfer
unused development rights only to adjacent parcels of land. The second
190. See Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75 (1973); Costonis, "Fair"Compensation and the Accommodation Power:Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975).

191. B. Chavooshian and T. Norman, Transfer of Development Rights: A New
Concept in Land Use Management, Extension Leaflet 492, Rutgers Univ. (1973).
192. See Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development Rights?, 40 PLANNING 7
(1974).
193. See Field & Conrad, Economic Issues in Programsof TransferableDevelopment
Rights, 51 LAND ECON. 331, 332 (1975).
194. See Costonis, Whichever Way you Slice It, DRT Is Here To Stay, 40 PLANNING 10 (1974).
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proposal, illustrated by a plan for Chicago,1 95 permits transfer of development rights to any developable sites within a designated district. A third
pattern proposed for Puerto Rico' 96 and New Jersey' 97 encompasses transfer of rights from nonurban areas to protect open spaces, agricultural
lands, or environmentally sensitive areas. 198 Fourth, transferable development rights might be assigned to all lands within the jurisdiction. 199 The
idea that affirmative rights in real property can be transferred from one
situs to another is not new. 200 In fact, the British have used development
201
rights transfer for over twenty-five years.
The TDR proposal does not fit precisely into the definition of either
the police power or the power of eminent domain. It has some of the
characteristics of both. The proposal involves more than police power
regulation, because some landowners are selectively deprived of their
rights to develop their land. Compensation is provided in the form of
transferable development rights, but an established requirement for the
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is that compensation be in
the form of money. A great deal of the legal literature on TDRs has been
concerned with the question
whether it is a constitutionally valid method of
20 2
land use management.
Whether TDR programs will be deemed confiscatory and therefore
invalid under a theory of police power regulation depends on the magnitude of the reduction in economic return that the courts will tolerate.
One commentator suggests that TDRs should not be viewed as a taking, but
rather as a reasonable exercise of the police power, because the governmental authority has not taken away the landowner's right to build; it has
regulated the locations for permissible development. 203 If TDR programs
195. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972).
196. See Woodbury, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Toolfor Planners,41
J. Am,.. INST. PLANNERS 3, 5 (1975).
197. See B. Chavooshian & T. Norman, supra note 191.
198. See Costonis, supra note 194.
199. This proposal is credited to Audrey Moore, a district supervisor of Fairfax
County, Virginia, and to William Goodman of the Maryland Senate. See Moore,
Transferable Development Rights: A Substitute for Zoning, presentation to the
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council Land Use Committee, December 2, 1972;
Goodman, Development Rights: Alternative to Chaos?, CENT. ATLANTIC ENVT'L NEWS

3, 5-6 (January 1973).
200. For an extensive discussion of the precedent for development rights, see
Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA.
ST. L. REV. 35, 53 et seq. (1974).
201. See Shlaes, supra note 192; Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J.
635, 642 (1974).
202. See Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause:
The Case of Manhattans Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 77 (1974); Rose, The
Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving Concept, 3 REAL EST. L.J.

330 (1975); Costonis, supra note 190.
203. See Marcus, supra note 202, at 105.
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are deemed to be regulatory measures, the courts may determine the
reasonableness of such programs on the basis of the restrictions alone,
20 4
disregarding the compensatory aspects of the programs.
However, it is quite likely that the application of a TDR system will be
deemed to involve an exercise of the eminent domain power on the ground
that the owner will not be able to realize a reasonable return from the use
of his land. 205 If so, the landowner must receive just compensation for the
loss of the right to develop his own land. It is unclear whether TDR
certificates for use on other property will be held by the courts to be
compensation. 20 6 A New20 York
court has found transferable development
7
rights to be inadequate.
A TDR proposal may face further constitutional challenge from the
developers. Developers may claim that they are denied substantive due
process and equal protection, because they bear the cost of a program
which benefits an entire planning region, while the need for the program
cannot be attributed uniquely to them. However, it is not clear that developers will in fact bear the full costs of the program. They may be able to
pass some or all of the costs of TDRs to subsequent purchasers or
208
tenants.
The major constitutional difficulty for TDRs seems to be that compensation in the form of transferable development rights is not a sum certain
in payment and is nonmonetary.209 The value of these rights is determined
by the market for the rights within the planning district or region. The
vagaries of this market may be of concern to the courts. One commentator
suggests two methods to avoid this problem. First, by exercising strict
control over development, stabilization of market values for the development rights may result.210 Second, the governmental agency can set up a
development rights bank to purchase the rights from owners and resell to
developers.
TDRs present several advantages over other land use control devices. 2 11 The timing and pattern of development can be partially controlled
by zoning and manipulation of the availability of public utility and other
services. Funding by the public treasury for land management objectives
204. See generally D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
§ 51 (1971).
205. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84
YALE L.J. 1101, 1104 (1975).
206. See Rose, supra note 202, at 354.
207. Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York (Tudor City), 77
Misc.2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup.Ct. 1973).
CONTROL LAW

208. One commentator argues that the developer cannot effectively pass along
the costs of the program to purchasers or tenants of the newly developed property,
but that there are no costs to be borne at all other than administrative costs. See
Shales, supra note 192, at 8. But see Woodbury, supra note 196, at 7.
209. See Rose, supra note 202, at 354.
210. See Note, supra note 205, at 1110.
211. See Carmichael, supra note 200, at 105.
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need not be increased, because the compensation for the curtailment of
development prerogatives comes from private parties who purchase the
rights.21 2 TDR systems correct a flaw of other land use devices by charging
the land development process with costs that formerly, and improperly, fell
upon the community in the form of environmental damage or the costs of
repairing that damage. 213 TDRs are also a flexible tool for resource protection, which can be adapted to protect virtually any resource endangered by
market forces.
The most serious obstacle to the implementation of a TDR program is
the possibility that there will be insufficient demand for the development
rights. Unless owners of land in the preservation zones can find willing
buyers for the development rights at a fair price, the value of the rights to
the landowner is severely limited. In a poorly organized or noncompetitive
market the developer is likely to reap large benefits from the development
rights sellers, because he will be able to select the landowner willing to sell
his rights for the lowest price. Furthermore, the developer will be able to
pass his costs of development rights purchases to consumers in terms of
higher purchase prices or rents.21 4 The presence of a public intermediary
agency, acting as auctioneer or operating a development rights bank, could
resolve this problem by controlling the available supply of development
21 5
rights and by making market information available to prospective sellers.
exist if
Any program must insure that an active market for the rights will
2 16
the program is to meet its objectives without unintended results.
Still other drawbacks to a TDR program have been cited. It is claimed
that TDRs will lead to chaos in planning, 2 17 although competent implementation of the program may avert this possibility.21 8 TDRs can result in
greater development densities in already congested areas. 219 They may be
220
unnecessary where other tools for preservation purposes are available.
Inaccurate projections by planners of future development needs may refor development rights, or alternatively, large
sult in insufficient demand
22
benefits for speculators. '
212. See Marcus, supra note 202, at 110.
213. See Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE

L.J. 75, 100 (1973).
214. See Field & Conrad, Economic Issues in Programsof TransferableDevelopment
Rights, 51 LAND ECON. 331, 338-9 (1975).
215. See Woodbury, supra note 196, at 5.

216. Id., at 9. One author has drafted proposed legislation which should
induce owners to preserve their land in open space and also create a market for
development rights. See Rose, supra note 201, at 651-663.
217. See Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 372, 287 (1971).
218. See Costonis, supra note 194, at 12.
219. See Note, supra note 205, at 1102.
220. See Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338,

370 n.161 (1972).
221. See Rose, supra note 202, at 357.
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The value of a TDR program in an agricultural setting is particularly
questionable. Testing and development of TDRs has predominantly occurred in municipal areas.2 22 Farmland owners may be reluctant to give up
control of development rights which they cannot use and whose value
cannot be realized unless an outside developer decides to purchase them.
Large-scale rezoning allowing nonagricultural uses will be necessary in
order to obtain an active market in an agricultural setting. 223 Furthermore,
if the development rights are taxed as real property, the farmland owners
will only get tax relief when a developer decides to purchase the develop224
ment rights from the farmer.
TDR programs cannot be effective unless adequately funded, professionally staffed, and relatively free of political interference. As with any
program authorizing distribution of lucrative franchises and privileges,
there is naturally a potential for abuse. The details of the transfer program
must be clearly meshed with market conditions and requirements, since
overly harsh developmental controls may discourage development completely. Harsh controls also may encourage developers to seek relaxation of
the more stringent provisions through political pressure. Much more development and refinement of the concept must occur if TDR programs are
to become an acceptable alternative to current techniques of farmland
preservation.
E. The Trust Concept
Placing land to be preserved into a trust is another measure of land use
control. At least three methods have been proposed: the private land
trust, the public trust, and the community trust. The private trust consists
of a private nonprofit corporation which accepts private donations with the
objective of holding land in its open and natural state. One model is the
Maine Coastal Heritage Trust, which is attempting to inventory and control the use of the coastal islands of Maine. The success of this type of trust
depends upon the wealth of private donors. The concept, however, might
be adopted as a framework to protect agricultural land in a public program
to purchase development rights.
The traditional common law doctrine of the public trust is not very
helpful for preserving agricultural land. The basic public trust theory is
that the state holds the public lands of the state in trust for the public, and
any attempt by the state to sell these lands to private interests or otherwise
divert them to private uses is subject to judicial scrutiny.22 5 Inherited from
222. See W. Bryant, Farmland Preservation Alternatives in Semi-Suburban
Areas, A.E. Ext. 75-5, Dept. of Agric. Econ., Cornell U. (April 1975).
223. Id.
224. Under one proposal, transferable development rights would not be taxed.
Rural owners would be taxed on the present use of the land rather than potential
use as reflected in market value. The same principle is, of course, involved in
differential assessment. See note 199 supra.
225. See Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property,
1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039, 1067 et seq.
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English common law, 226 the public trust principle is limited mostly to
tideland areas and protection of public interests in navigation, commerce,
or fishery.2 27 The concept may prove very useful for preservation of
natural resources. 228 However, the doctrine is ill-suited to modern agricultural land use policy, because it precludes use of the land for the benefit of
private interests.
The community land trust may prove significant for preserving farmland.2 29 This allows a farmer to allocate the developmental potential of all
his land to a certain portion of his acreage, e.g., 20 percent, if he dedicates
the remainder of his acreage to a community land trust.
The scheme proposes a voluntary agreement between the owner of the
farm and the local governmental entity. First, the agreement would establish the developmental value of the entire farm under the standard zoning
district regulations at the time of the agreement. Second, the agreement
would designate a limited area for development at a density that would
create a developmental value equal to that of the entire farm. Clearly, the
program is only feasible if zoning regulation allows non-farm use of the
land designated for development. Finally, the agreement would require
the remaining farmland to be offered for dedication to a community land
trust.
Since preservation of prime farmlands is the primary objective, the
area selected for development should be the least arable portion of the total
farm which would still allow for economic development and be compatible
with the community master plan. Upon executing the agreement, the farm
owner could sell the developable land at the current market price or hold
it. He and his successors would have the right to active farming use of the
dedicated land upon payment of a nominal rental fee. Thus, an operating
farmer who could sell his development rights would no longer have his
capital frozen in his business. Furthermore, he would not be paying real
estate taxes on the farmland. Neither would he lose his capital value in the
land, nor the potential appreciation, if he should choose to hold the
development area for future sale. Property taxes on the developable land
would, of course, increase as the developmental value of that land
increases.
A second feature of the proposed scheme would allow for the transfer
of development rights. This permits several farmers to cooperate in pre226. See J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN THE WATERS
AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 24-25 (2d ed. 1847).

227. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). See also
Ripley, Cohen, and Dwyer, EnvironmentalLand-Use Control: Common Law and Statutory Approaches, 28 MIAMI L. REv. 135, 151 (1973).
228. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
229. See Reuter, Preserving Farm Land Through Zoning and a Community Land
Trust, 1971 LAND-USE CONTROL ANNUAL, 169, 171-73. Reuter's article is the
source of the material on community land trusts.
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serving their farms and make large-scale farming operations possible.
Furthermore, by pooling the development rights from several farms,
larger and more attractive development areas could be created.
F. AgriculturalDistricting
The community trust proposal is an untested attempt not only to
preserve farmland and protect the farmer from rising taxes, but also to
insure that farming be economically feasible by releasing some of
the farmer's capital investment. New York has developed a method
known as agricultural districting to serve similar purposes. Agricultural
districting, however, allows the landowner to retain his ownership of the
land. The program permits farmers voluntarily to form a district and
thereby receive several benefits, including property tax concessions.
The agricultural district program has won wide-based support, because it has emphasized initiation of control at the local level.2 30 The
impetus to create a district generally must come from local landowners who
apply for such status by submitting a proposal to the county legislature,
although the state can initiate a district through the Commissioner of the
Department of Environmental Conservation, where "unique and irreplaceable" agricultural lands are threatened.2 3 1 Even in the case of state-initiated
districts, local legislative bodies or planning boards must assent if the
district is to be developed.
The process of developing a district is a long one, and many local bases
of authority in rural areas are consulted. A proposal must be approved by
the county legislature, the agricultural advisory committee (composed of
four farmers, four agribusinessmen, and one legislator), and the town and
county planning boards. A series of hearings provide a process of general
public review before it is referred to the State Commission of Environmental Conservation. When the state review process is completed the Commissioner can approve the proposal for adoption or make modifications. Final
approval on the proposal is reserved for the county legislative body. The
232
entire process may take six months.
Participation in the program is voluntary. A proposed district must
include at least 500 acres, and the farmers making the proposal must own
at least ten percent of the land to be included. After formation, a district is
affected by the following provisions. First, farmers may apply for use-value
assessment for property tax purposes. A later conversion to a noncompatible use subjects the owner to a rollback levy on tax savings in the prior
five-year period. Second, with the exception of health and safety regulations, local governmental bodies with a district in their jurisdiction may not
regulate either farm practices or structures within the districts. This pre230. Lapping, Preserving Prime Agricultural Land: The New York Experience,
& COUNTY PLANNING, 394-397 (Sept. 1975).
231. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
232. Id.

TOWN
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vents even the regulation of farm odors, for instance, a favorite target of
suburban residents who reside in a transitional or fringe area. Third, state
agencies are directed to modify their policies and programs so as to encourage commercial agriculture. Fourth, though it does not preclude the state's
exercise of the power of eminent domain, the agricultural district law
makes it a more difficult and rigorous process by forcing public agencies
which might utilize this power to examine alternative areas for their projects. Fifth, where local agencies have the ability to provide funding for
community facilities which might encourage non-farm development or act
as catalysts to it-water and sewage facilities for example-this power will
be modified. Sixth, where special service districts have been established to
tax land for sewage, water, and non-farm drainage programs, this power is
limited to assure low taxes on farmlands.
Eight years after formation, each agricultural district must be reexamined by the county and state. District boundaries may be modified, as
when part of a district is in strong demand for non-farm uses. But changes
can only be made at eight-year intervals, and not before the initial eightyear contract has expired. The state and county have the
authority to
23 3
continue any district indefinitely, regardless of local wishes.
By creating a district, local landowners and governmental authorities
acknowledge the intention to preserve agricultural land in the area. Given
the degree of public involvement necessary to create a district, much of the
discouragement occasioned by potential land conversion and speculation is
alleviated, and investment in farming is encouraged. This is especially
important in New York where the heavy commitment of land and resources essential to efficient dairy farming adds little to the developmental
value of the land for other purposes. The local problem of a shrinking tax
base is offset partially by state reimbursement of lost revenues for as much
as fifty percent.
The minimum area for a district is 500 acres because the program is
committed to the concept of a "critical mass" of land being necessary for
farming. 21 4 In those cases where a farmer is not in a district, because of an
acreage limitation or some other factor, he may still take advantage of the
tax deferral aspects of the law by entering an eight-year contract analogous
to the eight-year contracts of farmers in the district. The idea of preserving
large contiguous blocks of farmland seems to increase the acceptability and
credibility of a farmland preservation program in the eyes of the non-farm
public.3 5 Since the county is responsible for creating districts at the local
2 36
level, districts need not observe town boundary lines.
233. See W. Bryant, supra note 222, at 12.
234. On the importance of a critical mass of land in agriculture, see Phillon &
Derr, Critical Mass of Agriculture and the Maintenance of Productive Open Space, 3 J.
NORTHEXSTERN AGRICULTURAL ECON. COUNCIL,

1, 23-34 (May 1974).

235. See Bryant & Conklin, New FarmlandPreservationProgramsin New York, 41
J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 390, 392 (November 1975).

236. See W. Bryant, supra note 222, at 12.
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New York's agricultural district program has received a high degree of
participation since the enactment of the Agricultural District Law in
1971.217 By June, 1976, 294 districts had been formed controlling nearly
four million acres, or well over one-third of all agricultural land in the

state.25 8 Although a great many acres have been enrolled in the districting
program, there is not yet available good evidence on the effectiveness of

districting as a farmland preservation tool. Constitutional difficulties with
"taking" and the police power appear to be absent, since the program is
voluntary. Districting has been most popular in rural and semi-rural areas,
where the probability of selling farmland at greater than farm value in the
near future is not great. Conversely, in developing or semi-suburban
areas,25 9 the program has met resistance. The reason is, of course, that
farmland owners anticipate imminent conversion of land use.2 40 Other

preservation methods are necessary in these areas. This is why Suffolk
County has employed a program of development rights purchase, as discussed above.
V.

CONCLUSION

An effective method of implementing land use policy is essential to
preserve and maintain our farmland and to minimize the inordinate consumption of land in developing areas.2 41 Comprehensive planning should

begin at the state level. This would include methods for identifying areas of
critical concern and monitoring land uses within these areas.2 42 Planning
and control should then continue at local levels. A variety of preservation
methods is available, and perhaps no method alone is sufficient.
Zoning regulation, whether or not it excludes all nonagricultural land

use, depends on proper exercise of the police power and the reasonableness of constraints placed upon the land. Compensable zoning may resolve
constitutional difficulties and adjust for shifts in land value.2 43 However,
even the most carefully orchestrated zoning regulation is subject to
variances, exceptions, and rezoning hampering its dependability for con2 44
trolling development.
237. N.Y.AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 300-307 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1975).
238. Agricultural Resources Commission, State of New York Monthly Report
on the Status of Agricultural Districts, No. 44 (June 15, 1976).
239. For definitions of various classes of land, i.e., rural, semi-rural, semisuburban, suburban, and urban see Bryant & Conklin, supra note 235, at 392-4.
240. Land prices have ranged from five times the value of land for agricultural
purposes to over 10 times that value.
241. For a discussion of problems facing full-scale land use planning in North
Carolina, see Hinkley, A State's Approach to Land Use, 6 WATER SPECTRUM No. 2, 23
(1974).
242. See Slavin, Toward a State Land-Use Policy, 44 STATE GOV'T. 2 (Winter
1971), reprintedin 4 LAND-USE CONT. Q. 42, 48 (Fall 1970); Libby, Land Use Policy:
Implications for Commercial Agriculture, 56 AM. J. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1143,
1147-8 (1974).
243. See Carmichael, supra note 200, at 105.
244. One commentator suggests that zoning be abolished altogether, at least
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Public purchase of interests in land-either the entire fee or some
lesser interest such as development rights-will provide complete governmental control over the uses applied to those lands. The large costs required are the most significant drawback. Although a leaseback program
together with purchases reduces the drain on the public treasury, leaseback
programs have encountered stubborn resistance from farmers.
Any program which allows the farmer or other landowner to retain his
ownership of the fee simple will not solve the onerous problems of the
federal estate tax which have plagued farmers. Thus, those programs such
as fee simple purchase and leaseback or trust arrangements which remove
the ownership of the property from the farmer may be preferable to those
which allow the farmer to retain the title to his land. However, this tax
advantage has been significantly reduced by the Tax Reform Act of
1976.245

Development rights transfer may provide a means of guiding growth
and preserving open space without violating the "taking" clause on the one
hand and without massive public expenditures on the other. The urgent
need for effective and efficient land use control may demand the type of
far-reaching innovation that TDRs represent.2 46 TDRs require a vigorous
and efficient market, and this would be particularly difficult to establish in
an agricultural setting.
The experience in New York with agricultural districting is promising.
The program is popular, and as yet has faced no constitutional challenge.
It may provide effective protection for New York's agricultural lands,
although more time is required to evaluate the program. The major deficiency of districting is its inability to influence land use in developing areas,
where the need to control growth is most immediate and visible.
The success of a farmland preservation policy depends upon its political acceptability and effectiveness in attaining stated objectives. Differential
assessment in all its various forms has already been adopted by a majority
of the states. The tax relief differential assessment provides for farmers
may be its only valid justification. However, since the benefits of use-value
assessment seem to be regularly enjoyed by large corporate interests and
speculators, a social objective of aiding farmers may be thwarted.
The eligibility requirements of the Missouri statute are relatively easy
to meet. Moreover, the provision allowing a split-off of part of the land for
development or other nonqualifying use, while the remaining land continues to be qualified, is particularly favorable to landowners who are not
serious farmers. The Missouri statute can better meet an objective of
providing farmers tax relief and excluding non-farmers by requiring a
within a municipal context. See Heeter, Toward a More Effective Land-Use Guidance
System, 4 LAND-UsE CONT. Q. 8 (Winter 1970).
245. See note 166 supra.
246. See Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, The Legal Implementation of Coastal Zone
Management: The North CarolinaModel, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1, 37.
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minimum acreage or minimum farm income based on acreage and by
restricting the amount of allowable income from sources other than qualified farmland.
In order to promote farmland preservation, further changes are
needed in the Missouri program. First, the Missouri legislature should
promptly begin the process of constitutional amendment, so that the Agricultural Valuation and Assessment Act conforms to the Missouri constitution. In addition, a penalty should be included in the Act assessing the
landowner for converting land receiving use-value assessment to a nonqualifying use. A rollback tax or some variation of it will discourage conversion of farmland to more highly developed uses, but such a penalty cannot
alone control development in the face of rapidly rising property values. A
scheme combining differential assessment with tax deferral and agricultural zoning may produce the desired results. 2 47 It seems likely, however, that

restrictive agreements might also be needed to provide even more direct
governmental control over the pattern of development.
An acceptable farmland preservation program must be tailored to
specific agricultural situations in the state. Perhaps the most useful approach at the state level is enactment of enabling legislation which will
authorize local or regional development of preservation programs. Agricultural districting is particularly appealing because of its emphasis on
local participation in the planning process. At the same time, local programs must be integrated with state-wide land use policies. A large and
growing number of techniques is available, 248 and the General Assembly
should begin now to develop a carefully planned and comprehensive land
use policy.

247. See Woodbury, supra note 196, at 7.
248. See W. Washbon, The Prime Farmlands Transfer Fee: A Technique to
Utilize Non-tax Money for Choice Farmland Retention, A.E. Ext. 76-40, Dept. of
Agric. Econ., Cornell U. (October 1976). The author, an experienced land use
consultant, presents a new proposal to encourage farmland retention.
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